Post by @gasrios@floss.social

Jan Wildeboer 😷:krulorange:
@jwildeboer @social.wildeboer.net
2026-09-07 DNS Root Server Addresses
Letter IPv4 address IPv6 address Operator Operator origin

A | 198.41.0.4 | 2001:503:ba3e::2:30 | Verisign | United States
B | 170.247.170.2 | 2801:1b8:10::b | usc-Ist | United States
C | 192.33.4.12 | 2001:500:2::c | Cogent Communications | United States
D | 199.7.91.13 | 2001:500:2d::d | University of Maryland | United States
E | 192.203.230 |.10 2001:500:a8::e | NASA Ames Research Center | United States
F | 192.5.5.241 | 2001:500:2f::f | Internet Systems Consortium | United States
G | 192.112.36.4 | 2001:500:12::d0d | Defense Information Systems Agency | United States
H | 198.97.190.53 | 2001:500:1::53 | U.S. Army Research Lab | United States
I | 192.36.148.17 | 2001:7fe::53 | Netnod | Sweden
J | 192.58.128.30 | 2001:503:c27::2:30 | Verisign | United States
K | 193.0.14.129 | 2001:7fd::1 | RIPE NCC | Netherlands
L | 199.7.83.42 | 2001:500:9f::42 | ICANN | United States
M | 202.12.27.33 | 2001:dc3::35 | WIDE Project | Japan
2026-09-07 DNS Root Server Addresses Letter IPv4 address IPv6 address Operator Operator origin A | 198.41.0.4 | 2001:503:ba3e::2:30 | Verisign | United States B | 170.247.170.2 | 2801:1b8:10::b | usc-Ist | United States C | 192.33.4.12 | 2001:500:2::c | Cogent Communications | United States D | 199.7.91.13 | 2001:500:2d::d | University of Maryland | United States E | 192.203.230 |.10 2001:500:a8::e | NASA Ames Research Center | United States F | 192.5.5.241 | 2001:500:2f::f | Internet Systems Consortium | United States G | 192.112.36.4 | 2001:500:12::d0d | Defense Information Systems Agency | United States H | 198.97.190.53 | 2001:500:1::53 | U.S. Army Research Lab | United States I | 192.36.148.17 | 2001:7fe::53 | Netnod | Sweden J | 192.58.128.30 | 2001:503:c27::2:30 | Verisign | United States K | 193.0.14.129 | 2001:7fd::1 | RIPE NCC | Netherlands L | 199.7.83.42 | 2001:500:9f::42 | ICANN | United States M | 202.12.27.33 | 2001:dc3::35 | WIDE Project | Japan

At the core of the global internet are the DNS root servers. These 13 go-to places are at the top of authority when it comes to making sure you can connect to any server with a domain name. What you might not know is that 10 of these 13 root servers are ultimately under US jurisdiction. Should that worry you? I guess not, the current system is quite robust. But I deal in risk assessment and probabilities. And I think this isn't an ideal setup.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_nam

#DNS #Centralisation

Guilherme Rios
@gasrios @floss.social

@jwildeboer honest question: how much of a difference does it make, in practice, that not all of those servers are under US jurisdiction, when ICANN itself is an organization headquartered in the US, which means it ultimately must abide by the laws of that country, and can be compelled to act by its courts?

Replying to @gasrios@floss.social
Jan Wildeboer 😷:krulorange:
@jwildeboer @social.wildeboer.net
Jan Wildeboer 😷:krulorange: @jwildeboer@social.wildeboer.net
Two astronauts in space meme with one astronaut pointing a gun at the other. Astronaut without a gun: "Wait. All domain names and DNS are ultimately under control of the US through ICANN?" Astronaut with a gun: "Always has been"
Two astronauts in space meme with one astronaut pointing a gun at the other. Astronaut without a gun: "Wait. All domain names and DNS are ultimately under control of the US through ICANN?" Astronaut with a gun: "Always has been"